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Bilski and Warsaw v. Kappos
Docket No. 08-964
Argument Date: November 9, 2009
From: The Federal Circuit
by Kali Murray
Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
CASE AT A GLANCE 
In this case the Supreme Court has agreed to decide which test the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office should use when determining whether an inventor’s new method or process constitutes patentable 
subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act. 
P AT E N T S
What Must an Inventor Show in Order to Demonstrate that His Method Is Patentable?
ISSUE 
Must a “process,” such as a method for hedging risk, be embodied in 
a particular machine or transform a particular article into a different 
thing, to be patentable under Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952?
FACTS
Petitioners Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw filed U.S. Patent Ap-
plication No., 08/833,892 entitled Energy Risk Management Method in 
April 1997. The patent application disclosed a method that sought to 
manage weather-related risks associated with buying energy com-
modities. Claim One, the key claim in the disputed patent application, 
disclosed:
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity 
sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commod-
ity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said 
consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon 
historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk posi-
tion of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a 
counter-risk position to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity 
provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate 
such that said series of market participant transactions bal-
ances the risk position of said series of consumer transaction. 
 
The method disclosed in Claim One, notably, was not linked to the use 
of a computer or any other device.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) rejected the 
application due to the lack of eligible subject matter under Section 
101. The patent examiner rejected the disclosed invention under the 
previously discarded “technological arts” test. The disclosed claims 
were not tied to a particular machine, thus indicating that the inven-
tion was an abstract idea since it solved a mathematical problem. On 
appeal, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), in Ex 
Parte Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw, Appeal No. 2002-2257, 2006 
WL 5738364 (Bd. Pat. App. Int. 2006), held that the examiner erred by 
applying the “technological arts” test. 
The BPAI, however, still denied the applicants’ patent. The BPAI 
initially held that the applicants’ claims, which involved “non-physical 
risks,” did not transform anything into patentable material. The board 
next held that the applicants’ claims were “abstract ideas” because 
they preempted every possible way of performing the steps of the 
claimed process. Finally, the board held that the applicants’ claimed 
process did not produce a “useful, concrete and tangible result” under 
State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 
1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and thus was not a patentable subject 
under Section 101.
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the BPAI’s rejection of 
the patent application by a 9-3 vote. The majority opinion, authored by 
Chief Judge Paul Michel and joined by Judges Lourie, Schall, Bryson, 
Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost, and Moore, focused on whether the method 
disclosed in Claim One was an eligible process under Section 101 of 
the Patent Act. 
The key inquiry, according to the majority, was whether the claimed 
method was seeking to claim a fundamental principle, such as an 
abstract idea or a mental process. In doing so, the majority analyzed 
a number of cases, previously decided by the Supreme Court, such as 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978) and Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), which indicated 
Section 101 does not protect fundamental principles such as nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. Despite some significant 
divergences in the outcomes of these cases, the majority was able to 
distill from them a two-part test for determining whether a process is 
eligible for a patent.
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This “machine-or-transformation” test stated that an applicant can 
show that a process claim is eligible patent subject matter under Sec-
tion 101: (1) by showing that a claim is tied to a particular machine or 
(2) by showing that a claim transforms an article. The majority then 
applied its test to the disputed claim at issue and concluded that it did 
not involve eligible subject matter under Section 101 because it was 
not tied to a specific machine or apparatus and did not transform any 
article to a different state or thing, due to its failure to be embodied in 
or represented by a physical object. 
The majority’s opinion prompted three dissents. Judge Newman 
contended that treating patentable subject matter under Section 101 
as a “threshold” inquiry would prevent the development of innovative 
technologies and was not supported by previous historical practice, 
the statutory text, or legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952. 
Judge Mayer argued that the inquiry should have been whether the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had correctly held in State 
Street and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 1998), that no business method exception existed in patent 
law. He criticized the majority’s adoption of the “machine-or-trans-
formation” test since creative drafting of claims could circumvent 
the test. Judge Rader, like Judge Newman, asserted that the standard 
articulated by the majority would negatively impact new technologies, 
and moreover, could have been addressed by finding that the method 
outlined in Claim One was an abstract idea and thus ineligible patent 
subject matter under Section 101. 
As these dissents indicate, the new standard set out by the Federal 
Circuit is highly contested. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the dispute.
CASE ANALYSIS
The fragmented decision by the Federal Circuit indicates the im-
portance of Bilski in defining what kind of process can be patented. 
Section 101 states in crucial part, “[w]hoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process … may obtain a patent … subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.” The Supreme Court in Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1981), construed the patentable-
subject matter requirement under Section 101 in a broad manner, 
stating that the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952 indicated 
that patentable subject matter could “include anything under the sun 
that is made by man.” The Federal Circuit in State Street and AT&T 
adopted this broad reasoning and rejected the so-called business 
method exception to allow any process to be considered patentable 
under Section 101 when it produced “a useful, concrete and tangible 
result.” The Federal Circuit’s majority holding in Bilski, however, 
represents a retreat from this broad precedent. This raises key ques-
tions as to whether the Supreme Court will reemphasize its broad 
holding in Chakrabarty or adopt a narrower approach similar to the 
one adopted by the Federal Circuit in this case.
The petitioners raise three key claims. First, they claim that the statu-
tory text of Section 101—in particular, the term any—demonstrates 
that the patentable subject matter requirement should be construed 
broadly. Under this reading, the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-trans-
formation” test conflicts with precedent (such as Chakrabarty and 
Gottschalk) that suggests that Supreme Court has rejected rigid tests 
within the context of Section 101. Second, the petitioners contend 
the recent congressional amendments related to Section 273 of the 
Patent Act, which allowed prior users to raise certain defenses when 
confronted with an infringement claim on the part of a “business 
method” patent owner, suggest that process patents could consti-
tute patentable subject matter under the Patent Act. The petitioners 
further emphasize that the congressional intent in passing Section 
273 could be thwarted by applying the “machine-or-transformation” 
test, since that test would render most “business method” patents 
nonpatentable. Third, the petitioners argue that the Federal Circuit’s 
“machine-or-transformation” test constitutes an improper foray into 
policy-making by the Federal Circuit. In stepping into these waters, 
the petitioners assert, the Federal Circuit unsettled the parties’ prop-
erty expectations. 
According to the petitioners, these three basic claims ultimately sug-
gest that Supreme Court should adopt a “practical application” test 
to determine whether a method is patentable subject matter under 
Section 101. This practical application test would require that if an 
inventor is claiming a fundamental principle, like an abstract idea, 
then that principle must be embodied in a practical application for it 
to be considered patentable under Section 101.
In its response, the government (the solicitor general is representing 
the respondent David Kappos, the current undersecretary of USPTO) 
emphasizes that the patent regime historically sought to protect 
defined technological innovation. First, the government claims that 
Section 101, while broad, has discrete limits on what can be patented. 
According to the government, narrow reading of Section 101 is sup-
ported by reference to historical practice and a circumscribed statu-
tory reading. The government relies on historical evidence from both 
early English and American patent practice to claim that Section 101 
does not extend patent-eligibility to “economic, social or legal” tasks. 
These tasks fall outside the “useful arts” protected in the Constitu-
tion. The government then claims these historical limits are sup-
ported by the statutory text of Section 101. Specifically, Section 101, 
in its other enumerated categories—machine, composition of matter, 
and manufacture—protects only “things made by man” or “involving 
technology.” Thus, the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” 
test successfully captures this preexisting preference for a patented 
subject matter that reflects technological innovation. Moreover, this 
“machine-or-transformation” test does not limit evolving technologies 
(like software) because such technology will often satisfy the test. For 
instance, software process claims could be embodied in a machine  
or use technological means to transform the relevant data into a  
new state.
The government next rejects the premise that the Patent Act’s general 
reference in Section 273 to a “method of doing or conducting busi-
ness” demonstrated a congressional intent to extend patent eligibil-
ity to all processes that could be patentable subject matter under 
Section 101. The government further contends that the “machine-or-
transformation” test does not undermine Congress’s intent in passing 
Section 273. The test does not eliminate the possibility of all business 
methods; rather, it merely requires a patent that claims a business 
method to fulfill the requirements of the proposed “machine-or- 
transformation” test.
The government concluded its respondent’s brief by stressing the  
petitioners’ claims cannot be sustained if the Federal Circuit’s 
“machine-or-transformation” test is adopted. The petitioners’ claim 
s are a method for hedging risk in the purchase and sale of com-
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modities and thus are directed toward organizing human economic 
activity. Therefore, the USPTO correctly denied the patent application 
since those claims are not eligible subject matter under Section 101.
SIGNIFICANCE
Bilski v. Kappos demonstrates the Supreme Court’s ongoing interest 
in providing guidance to the patent community. Bilski will be the first 
significant statement on patentable subject matter under Section 
101 since Chakrabarty. A broad standard of patentable subject matter 
is often seen as prompting significant economic innovation. For 
instance, the Supreme Court’s broad statement of patentable-subject 
matter under Section 101 in Chakrabarty has often been understood 
as prompting the innovative field of biotechnology within the United 
States. 
Recently, however, the usefulness of a broad standard of patentability 
under Section 101 has come into question. In particular, critics have 
pointed to the problems associated with granting too many patents, 
such as the costs of avoiding patent infringement within a given field, 
overly aggressive patent holders, and substantial licensing thickets. 
“Process patents” have been subject to particular complaints, given 
their potential breadth. Thus, narrowing patent-eligible subject 
matter under Section 101 would provide a key threshold inquiry into 
whether a patent should issue in the first place. Section 101 would 
thus be considered a key analytical inquiry that would be undertaken 
to assess the validity of a patent, along with the other conditions of 
patentable subject matter contained in Section 101 (utility), Section 
102 (novelty), and Section 103 (nonobviousness) of the Patent Act. 
Thus, the Supreme Court in Bilksi confronts a key issue with sig-
nificant policy consequences. A broad standard of patentable subject 
matter under Section 101 does much to spur innovative technologies, 
an issue of considerable interest in a struggling economy. A narrow 
standard of patentable subject matter may prevent the issuance of 
patents that could negatively impact the public domain. Thus, the 
Supreme Court once again is in an ideal position to resolve this ten-
sion by crafting a standard that will be provide clarity to the patent 
community. 
Kali Murray is an assistant professor of law at Marquette University 
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a member of its Intellectual Property 
Program. She can be reached at kali.murray@marquette.edu or 
414.288.5486.
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